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Ruth Bader Ginsburg*
Judicial Independence: The Situation
of the U.S. Federal Judiciaryt
Essential to the rule of law in any land is an independent judiciary,
judges not under the thumb of other branches of Government, and
therefore equipped to administer the law impartially. The U.S. Fed-
eral Judiciary has been a model for the world in that regard. Fortu-
nately so, for we can promote the rule of law, administered fairly and
fearlessly elsewhere-in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Kosovo,
Ukraine, for example-only by vigilantly practicing at home what we
preach abroad. As recent experience confirms, however, judicial inde-
pendence is vulnerable to assault; it can be shattered if the society law
exists to serve does not take care to assure its preservation.
On the essence of independent, impartial judging, a 1980 comment
by then Justice William H. Rehnquist seems to me right on target.
The man who from 1986 until 2005 served as Chief Justice of the
United States compared the role of a judge
to that of a referee in a basketball game who is obliged to call a foul against a
member of the home team at a critical moment in the game: he will be soundly
booed, but he is nonetheless obliged to call it as he saw it, not as the home
crowd wants him to call it.1
My remarks this afternoon concentrate on judicial independence in
the place I know best, the Third Branch of the U.S. Government, and
on current threats to its vitality. Preliminarily, I will note a few,
among many, distress signals from other lands.
I.
Examples abound internationally of how the best efforts of judges
to adjudicate cases fairly can be thwarted. From dozens of illustra-
tions one might choose, I will briefly describe assaults in our time on
judicial independence in Uganda, Russia, and Ecuador.
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
t The text of this lecture was presented at the University of Nebraska College of
Law on April 7, 2006. The lecture was made possible by the Roman L. Hruska
Institute for the Administration of Justice.
1. William H. Rehnquist, Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7 PEPP. L.
REV. 227, 229-30 (1980).
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In what has been called a "bizarre tug of war" between Uganda's
judges and the country's military, a special terrorism squad of the
Ugandan army besieged the High Court in February.2 The assault
forced the evacuation of the Chief Justice and his colleagues.3 The
armed men aimed to re-arrest and detain in military custody several
individuals the Court was about to release on bail. The targets of the
army squad's raid managed to avoid military detention. They did so
by refusing to sign their release papers. Choosing to remain in civil-
ian custody, they escaped a fate far worse-capture by army thugs.4
My second illustration is less current. It concerns the Constitu-
tional Court of Russia. During 1992 and 1993, conflict developed be-
tween then President Boris Yeltsin and the pro-Communist
legislature. In March 1993, the legislature tried, unsuccessfully, to
impeach President Yeltsin. In September 1993, Yeltsin responded by
dissolving the legislature. The Constitutional Court upheld the legis-
lature's prerogative, declaring that Yeltsin had violated the Constitu-
tion and could be impeached. President Yeltsin signaled his
displeasure: He ordered his bodyguards to kill the Chief Justice's pet
cat and threatened to cut off the Court's water supply. Ultimately, he
took more decisive action. In October 1993, Yeltsin signed a decree
suspending the Constitutional Court pending adoption of a new con-
stitution. A newly installed Constitutional Court, with narrower ju-
risdiction and fewer judges, commenced work in 1995, and the
prospect of impeachment no longer embarrassed the President.
My third example also involves an Executive's response to an im-
peachment effort. It concerns manipulation of judicial appointments
and tenure in Ecuador. In December 2004, Ecuador's then President,
Lucio Gutierrez, summoned members of the nation's Congress to re-
move twenty-seven of the Supreme Court's thirty-one members. 5
That summons was in apparent retaliation for the Court's decisions
rendered during a failed effort to impeach Gutierrez on corruption
charges.6 Gutierrez described the removal measure, ironically, as a
means to restore judicial independence to a too partisan judiciary.7 A
compliant Congress also replaced judges on the Electoral and Consti-
tutional Courts, stacking those tribunals with the administration's
supporters. Protests ensued against the Government's blatant moves
2. The East African, When Generals and Judges Fall Out, Who Will Pass Sentence?,
AFRICA NEWS, Feb. 14, 2006.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See Steven Dudley, Crisis in Ecuador: Ecuador's President Ousted Amid Unrest,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 2005, at 18A.
6. See Juan Forero, Ecuador's President Revokes Curbs on Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
17, 2005, at A10.
7. See Juan Forero, Ecuador's President Vows to Ride Out Crisis over Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005, at A12.
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to pack the courts.8 In April 2005, Ecuador's Congress disbanded the
Supreme Court, as then composed. Gutierrez resigned shortly there-
after, but a bitterly divided legislature prevented selection of a new
Court until November 30 of last year, when thirty-one new judges,
named by an independent four-member committee, were sworn in.9
(The United States faced its own court-packing crisis almost sev-
enty years ago. The Supreme Court resisted President Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt's New Deal program. In a thirteen-month span, the
Court held unconstitutional sixteen pieces of federal social and eco-
nomic legislation. Frustrated by his inability to replace the "nine old
men" then seated on the Court, President Roosevelt, in February
1937, sent to the Senate a bill to overcome the Court's recalcitrance.
He proposed adding one Justice for each member of the Court who had
served ten years and did not retire after his seventieth birthday.
FDR's proposal would have immediately swelled the Court's size from
nine to fifteen members. (If the 1937 plan were to be applied to the
current Court, next Term we would have a thirteen-member bench.)
Two developments manifest by the end of 1937 combined to defeat
Roosevelt's plan: public opposition to the President's endeavor to cap-
ture the Court and a growing readiness of the Justices to defer to leg-
islative judgments on matters of social and economic policy.)
II.
The United States Supreme Court, in its 217-year history, has
fared far better than the high courts in Uganda, Russia, and Ecuador,
whose plights I just recounted. Under our Constitution, federal judges
hold their offices essentially for life, with no compulsory retirement
age, and their salaries may not be diminished by the legislature.10
Through life tenure and compensation that cannot be reduced, the
Founders of the United States sought to secure the Judiciary's inde-
pendence from the political branches of the Government, and thus, the
judges' ability to decide cases impartially. Yet I doubt even that insu-
lation would have protected the federal bench if we did not have a
culture that frowns on attempts to make the courts over to fit the
President's or the Congress' image.
I will next describe three instances in which the U.S. High Court
confronted alleged unconstitutional assertions of power by the Execu-
tive. My first two illustrations generate no sparks in the United
8. See id.
9. See Juan Forero, Ecuador: A New Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005, at
A14.
10. The Constitution guarantees that federal judges "shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior ... and shall ... receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1, cl. 2.
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States today. My third example-a pair of decisions handed down in
June 2004-concerns the Court's initial responses to the pleas of per-
sons detained by the U.S. military in the aftermath of the September
11 terrorist attacks.
I will recall first a 1974 case entitled United States v. Nixon,11
which yielded a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Warren
Burger. That case was precipitated by a subpoena issued by a trial
court judge, United States District Judge John Sirica, at the height of
the Watergate scandal. Judge Sirica's subpoena directed the Presi-
dent of the United States to produce, for use in a criminal proceeding,
tape recordings and documents capturing conversations between Pres-
ident Nixon and his closest advisers. In campaigns for the Presidency,
Nixon had called for the restoration of "law and order," and promised
to appoint judges who would not be "soft on crime."12 A United States
Supreme Court that included four Nixon appointees, among them
Chief Justice Burger and then Associate Justice Rehnquist, declared
the law: the President was obliged to turn over the evidence as Judge
Sirica's disclosure order demanded. The President obeyed the Judici-
ary's command: he turned over the tapes and documents, then
promptly resigned from office.
Earlier in time, my second illustration is popularly known as the
Steel Seizure Case.13 In the spring of 1952, the United States was
heavily engaged in the Korean War. At home, inflation was rising,
and labor unrest was widespread. For several months, the United
Steel Workers of America had been seeking a substantial pay in-
crease, which the steel companies had repeatedly refused. With nego-
tiations at an impasse, the steel workers voted to strike beginning on
April 9, 1952. On the evening of April 8, to keep the steel mills in
operation, President Truman issued an executive order directing the
Secretary of Commerce to take possession of eighty-five steel
companies.14
The steel companies sued to stop the seizure. The companies ar-
gued that the President's order was an unconstitutional encroachment
on the legislative domain of Congress. In response, the Government
urged that a strike would so endanger national security that the Pres-
ident must be held to possess "inherent power" to seize the steel mills
without first gaining explicitly empowering legislation. The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the Govern-
ment's plea and enjoined enforcement of the President's order. But
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
11. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
12. See, e.g., 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN,
1962-1972, at 376 (1989).
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
14. See id. at 590-91 (appendix to the opinion of the Court).
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cuit, sitting en banc, immediately voted 5-4 to stay the district court's
injunction, with the eight judges appointed by President Truman
evenly divided on the issue. One month later, a 6-to-3 majority of the
United States Supreme Court declared the President's order invalid;
the authority to permit Executive Branch seizure of private property,
the Court held, is a power the Constitution gives exclusively to Con-
gress "in both good and bad times."15
While four of the Justices in the Steel Seizure Case majority were
appointed by Truman's predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, the fifth and
sixth votes against the President's position came from Justices Burton
and Clark, both Truman appointees. President Truman immediately
complied with the Court's judgment. Less than thirty minutes after
the Justices finished reading their opinions from the bench, the Presi-
dent dispatched a letter ordering the Secretary of Commerce to return
the seized mills to their owners. 16
Almost fifty years later, on the morning of September 11, 2001,
deadly terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City
and the Pentagon just across the river from the U.S. Capitol shocked
our Nation and world, and resulted in approximately 3,000 deaths.
The attacks once again thrust into question the scope of executive au-
thority in times of war and national peril. Controversies arising in the
aftermath of September 11 are ongoing. I will describe the Court's
first full decisions in point, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld17 and Rasul v. Bush,18
both decided in June 2004.
Yaser Esam Hamdi was a U.S. citizen alleged by the Government
to be an "enemy combatant."' 9 Born in the United States but raised
in Saudi Arabia, Hamdi was seized in Afghanistan by allies of the
United States during 2001 hostilities against the Taliban. Originally
sent to the U.S. naval base in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, Hamdi was
transferred to a Navy brig in Charleston, South Carolina, when his
U.S. citizenship became known. In June 2002, Hamdi's father peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his son's release. He main-
tained that the detention, then incommunicado, lacked legal
authority.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia ruled that Hamdi must be allowed to challenge the factual basis
for his detention. 20 (The petition his father filed alleged that he was
not a combatant at all, but a humanitarian relief worker.) Reviewing
and reversing the district court's judgment, the United States Court of
15. Id. at 589.
16. See generally MAEVA MARcus, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE (1977).
17. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality decision).
18. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
19. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 535-36 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the President's authority to or-
der the detention. The appeals court found it lawful, given the war
against terrorism and consequent security concerns, to deny Hamdi
any opportunity to show he was not an "enemy combatant."21 The Su-
preme Court agreed to review that determination.
The Government argued in the Supreme Court that judicial review
of the detention of persons the Executive had classified as "enemy
combatants," if it could be had at all, should be "heavily circum-
scribed."2 2 Although the Justices did not sign on to a one-voiced opin-
ion, the Court decisively rejected the position that the Executive has
unreviewable authority to impose open-ended detention on citizens.
Eight Justices agreed that Hamdi must be allowed to challenge the
factual basis of his detention before a tribunal meeting the demands of
due process. Even in "our most challenging and uncertain moments"
when "our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely
tested," Justice O'Connor wrote for a four-Justice plurality, "we must
preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight
abroad."23 "[Hlistory and common sense," she noted, "teach us that an
unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a
means of oppression and abuse."24 "[A] state of war," her opinion
makes clear, "is not a blank check for the President" to remove the
rights of citizens. 2 5
Justice Souter, with whom I joined, reached no constitutional ques-
tion. We concluded that Congress had accorded the President no au-
thority to detain people without formal charges and trial.26
The other 2004 "enemy combatant" case, Rasul v. Bush, concerned
the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured in hostilities
abroad, then transported to the U.S. naval base at Guant6.namo Bay.
The Government maintained that Guant~namo detainees were not
entitled to prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Conventions and
could not challenge the legality of their detention in any U.S. court.
Lawyers for detainees sought writs of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. They were unsuc-
cessful in the courts of first and second instance. Those courts held
that the Judiciary lacked power to intervene. The Supreme Court dis-
agreed. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court ruled simply and only that the
Guantdnamo detainees may petition for federal court review of their
21. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003).
22. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535.
23. Id. at 532.
24. Id. at 530.
25. Id. at 536.




situations.2 7 It reserved for another day what the outcome of such
petitions should be.
Just last week, the Court heard argument in another Guantdnamo
Bay case, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.28 The challenger, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, is a citizen of Yemen alleged to have served as a personal
driver for Osama bin Laden. Hamdan contests the authority for, and
adequacy of, a two-stage military tribunal process the President de-
creed: first, a procedure for classifying detainees as "enemy combat-
ants"; second, provisions governing trial of persons so classified. The
case presents a threshold question: Did a law Congress passed at the
end of 200529 effectively bar federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, from considering currently pending Guantdnamo Bay cases in
advance of actual classifications and convictions?
Before the summer recess, the Court will announce its disposition
of the pending petition. I will say no more about the Hamdan case
except to remark on the open character of the Court's hearing, and the
high quality of the briefing and arguments on both sides. The Court
confronted hard issues; it had the aid of able counsel and amici; the
audiotape of the arguments was instantly available to the press and
broadcast media. The adversary system to which we adhere was on
display before a watchful world.
III.
I turn now to some current concerns about the security of the Fed-
eral Judiciary in our constitutional order. Reading or listening to
what some members of the Congress and the press say about the fed-
eral courts, one might not entirely understand what history, in large
part, bears out: Federal judges, whether appointed by Republican or
Democratic Presidents, generally endeavor to administer justice im-
partially and to interpret laws reasonably and sensibly, with due re-
straint and fidelity to precedent. Yet in some political circles, it is
fashionable to criticize and even threaten federal judges who decide
cases without regard to what the "home crowd" wants.
A headline-producing illustration: In late March 2005, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit refused to order the
feeding tube restored to Terri Schiavo, the brain-damaged Florida wo-
man at the center of a right-to-refuse-life-support controversy. That
court and the district court had simply read a one-time-only federal
statute as it was written, not as a goodly number of the members of
Congress wished it had been written. In angry reaction, the then
House Majority Leader accused federal judges of "thumb[ing] their
27. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004).
28. 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005).
29. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
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nose[s] at Congress and the [P]resident."3o He warned: "IT]he time
will come for the men responsible for this to answer for their behav-
ior..... "31 "Congress," he amplified, "for many years has shirked its
responsibility to hold the judiciary accountable. No longer."3 2 Other
members of Congress chimed in. A House Judiciary Committee mem-
ber, for example, cautioned federal judges to remember that Congress
"ha[s] the constitutional authority to eliminate any and all inferior
courts."
3 3
Similarly unsettling, not long after the murders of a state court
judge in Atlanta and a federal judge's mother and husband in Chicago
in 2005, a prominent senator gave a widely reported speech on the
Senate floor.34 After inveighing against "activist jurists," he sug-
gested there may be "a cause-and-effect connection" between judicial
activism and the "recent episodes of courthouse violence in this
country."3 5
Moving beyond verbal blasts, in May 2005, the Chairman for the
House Judiciary Committee announced that the Committee was con-
sidering the creation of an "office of inspector general for the federal
judiciary."36 The office would investigate allegations of judicial mis-
conduct and report them to Congress. In the Committee Chairman's
view, judges must "be punished in some capacity for behavior that
does not rise to the level of impeachable conduct."3 7 If the Chairman's
subsequent action indicates the role he envisions for the proposed in-
spector general, judges have good cause for concern. In June 2005, the
Chairman's Office dispatched a letter to Joel Flaum, Chief Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, com-
plaining that the court had ordered an unlawfully low sentence for a
30. Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing then H. Majority Leader, Rep. Tom Delay).
31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Editorial, Attacking a Free Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at A22 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting then H. Majority Leader, Rep. Tom Delay).
33. Charles Babington, GOP Is Fracturing over Power of Judiciary, WASH. POST, Apr.
7, 2005, at A4 (quoting Rep. Steve King of Iowa, Member, H. Comm. on the
Judiciary).
34. See Editorial, The Judges Made Them Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A22.
35. Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to 'Political' Decisions; 'Unaccounta-
ble' Judiciary Raises Ire, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2005, at A7 (quoting Sen. John
Cornyn of Texas).
36. David D. Kirkpatrick, Republican Suggests a Judicial Inspector General, N.Y.
TIMES, May 10, 2005, at A12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rep. F.




narcotics-case defendant. The letter called for a "prompt response...
to rectify" the decision. 38
Among other troubling congressional initiatives are proposals to
restrict federal courts' references to foreign law. 3 9 In a recent inter-
view, Justice Stephen Breyer addressed the apparent misunderstand-
ing. He explained why the Court's citations to foreign laws and
decisions should not be controversial.40 "References to cases else-
where are never binding," Justice Breyer emphasized.41 We interpret
and apply only our own Constitution-our own laws. But it can add to
our store of knowledge "to look at how other people [with a commit-
ment to democracy similar to our own] solve similar problems."42 He
compared references to the decisions of foreign and international
tribunals to references to a treatise or to a professor's work.
Lest I appear to be spreading too much gloom, I should emphasize
the vocal defenders of the Judiciary-intelligent voices that do not di-
vide along Party lines. The New York Times recently editorialized,
"The courts will not always be popular; they will not even always be
right. But if Congress succeeds in curtailing the judiciary's ability to
act as a check on the other two branches, the nation will be far less
free."43 Former Solicitor General Ted Olson published a similar view:
"Americans understand," I hope he is right, "that no system is perfect
and no judge immune from error, but also that our society would
crumble if we did not respect the judicial process and the judges who
make it work."44
History bears out that Congress is unlikely to employ the nuclear
weapon-impeachment-against judges who decide cases in a way
that the "home crowd" does not want. In the 217 years since the ratifi-
cation of the U.S. Constitution, the House of Representatives has im-
peached only thirteen federal judges; in only seven instances did
impeachment result in a Senate conviction, 45 and those judges were
impeached and convicted not for wrongly interpreting the law, but for
38. Maurice Possley, Lawmaker Prods Court, Raises Brows; Demands Longer Term
in Chicago Drug Case, Cm. TRn., July 10, 2005, at C1 (quoting Rep. Sensenbren-
ner's letter).
39. See American Justice for Americans Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 3
(2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005); Constitution Restoration Act, S. 520, H.R.
1070, 109th Cong. § 201 (2005); H. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).




43. Editorial, supra note 32.
44. Theodore B. Olson, Lay off Our Judiciary, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2005, at A16.
45. Federal Judicial Center, Impeachments of Federal Judges, http://www.jc.gov
history/home.nsf (follow "Judges of the United States" hyperlink; then follow "Im-
peachments of Judges" hyperlink) (last visited July 6, 2006).
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unquestionably illegal behavior, including such high crimes as extor-
tion, tax evasion, and perjury.4 6
Although casual use of impeachment against federal judges is a
remote prospect, another threat to judicial independence cannot be
discounted so easily. In President Clinton's second term, it bears re-
minding, political hazing of federal judicial nominees was unrelenting.
The confirmation process in those years often strayed from examining
the qualifications of each nominee into an endeavor to uncover some
hidden "liberal" agenda the nominee supposedly harbored. For many
Democrats, President Bush's successive terms have been pay-back
time, an opportunity to hold up or reject Bush nominees to the Federal
Judiciary on ideological grounds.
Injecting politics prominently into the nomination and confirma-
tion process means long delays in filling judicial vacancies, and delay,
in the face of mounting caseloads, threatens to erode the quality of
justice the Federal Judiciary can provide. Vacancies in large numbers
inevitably sap the energy and depress the spirits of the judges left to
handle heavy dockets. That is a point former Chief Justice Rehnquist
stressed annually in his State of the Judiciary report, both during
Clinton's presidency, and with regard to President Bush's nominees.
Our new Chief Justice, John G. Roberts, Jr., has sounded the same
theme. In his confirmation hearings, he said he would be "vigilant to
protect the independence and integrity of the Supreme Court and judi-
cial branch," appreciating that "[a]n independent judiciary is one of
the keys to safeguarding the rule of law."47 Distinguishing judging
from political activity, then Judge Roberts commented on his tenure
on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit:
I have been fortunate for the past two years to serve on a court in which...
[the] judges put aside [their political] ties and... views and become judges all
focused on the same mission of vindicating the rule of law.... [Tihe decisions
of the D. C. Circuit... are almost always unanimous.... [T]o the extent that
there are any disagreements, they don't shape up along political lines.4 8
He added, however, that "the more the [confirmation] process becomes
politicized, the less likely" that ideal will be achieved.4 9
In addition to confirmation politics, recent congressional efforts to
police judges' "good Behavior"50 include criticism of, and proposed lim-
itations on, judges' attendance at out-of-town educational events. A
46. Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So "Good Behavior". Criminal Prose-
cution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1617, 1617 n.2 (1994).
47. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Jus-
tice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 258
(2005).
48. Id. at 254.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 10.
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few years ago, a high-profile Republican senator launched an inquiry
into the extracurricular activities of federal judges, most of which con-
sist of lecturing, writing, and participating in training jurists. He con-
cluded that judges ought to "stay home and mind the store."5 1 More
recently, in January 2006, three Democratic senators co-sponsored a
measure that would prohibit federal judges from taking trips of more
than one day to legal education seminars underwritten by private or-
ganizations, including, along with commercial enterprises, law
schools, and bar associations.5 2
These proposals are, in my view, misguided. Judges, of course,
should not expose themselves to influence by private interests. But,
as I see it, current ethics rules are sufficient to protect against that
risk. Impeding judges' ability to attend and participate in out-of-town
events, as former Chief Justice Rehnquist critically commented, runs
"contrary to the public interest in encouraging an informed and edu-
cated Judiciary, and contrary to the American belief in unfettered ac-
cess to ideas."53
I should mention, too, the host of jurisdiction-curtailing measures
placed in the congressional hopper this year and the year before.
These include the Streamlined Procedures Act,54 severely shrinking
the scope of federal habeas review. Another bill introduced last year
would strip federal courts of jurisdiction over actions seeking relief
against a governmental unit's or officer's "acknowledgement of God as
the sovereign source of law, liberty, or government."55
Of the same genre, the Safeguarding our Religious Liberties Act,56
introduced in December 2005, would remove federal courts' authority
to decide any case concerning the Ten Commandments, the Pledge of
Allegiance, or the National Motto. Introduced a month earlier, the We
the People Act57 would substantially reduce the problem of overloaded
federal court calendars. It would take away from the federal courts
authority to adjudicate free exercise or establishment of religion
claims, privacy claims (including those raising "any issue of sexual
practices, orientation, or reproduction"), and any claim to equal pro-
tection of the laws "based upon the right to marry without regard to
sex or sexual orientation."58
51. Robert Schmidt, Federal Judges in the Jet Set?, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 6, 1998, at 6
(quoting Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa).
52. Federal Judiciary Ethics Reform Act, S. 2202, 109th Cong. (2006).
53. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the American Law Institute An-
nual Meeting (May 14, 2001), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/pub-
licinfo/sp_05-14-01.html.
54. S. 1088, H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005).
55. Constitution Restoration Act, S. 520, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005).
56. H.R. 4576, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).




And there are more, but here again, history is instructive. Juris-
diction-stripping reactions to disliked decisions have been proposed
perennially. In the 1950s, desegregation and domestic-security cases
were on some legislators' strip lists; in the 1960s, federal court review
of certain criminal justice matters; in the 1970s, busing to achieve ra-
cial integration in schools; in the 1980s, abortion and school prayer.
None of these efforts succeeded, and current efforts seem to me to
have no better chance of passage. A simple truth has helped to spare
the Federal Judiciary from onslaughts of this character: It is easier to
block enactment of a bill than to get a bill enacted.
I note, finally, a head-on Congress-Court confrontation proposed in
2004 and revived the next year. The most recent try, entitled the Con-
gressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2005, would al-
low Supreme Court judgments declaring a federal law
unconstitutional to be overturned by a two-thirds vote of the House
and Senate.59
A Constitution providing for legislative review of court decisions
resolving constitutional questions, author and journalist Anthony
Lewis observed, "would be more democratic in the sense that it would
remove constraints on majority rule."60 But, Lewis rightly reminds
us, in the words of Aharon Barak, President of the Supreme Court of
Israel: "Democracy is not only majority rule. Democracy is also the
rule of basic values ... values upon which the whole democratic struc-
ture is built, and which even the majority cannot touch."6 1 The Foun-
ders of the United States did not envision a rule of law based on pure
majoritarianism, 62 and I see no cause to embark on such an experi-
ment now.
This description would be incomplete if I did not remark on the
election of judges, at least at some levels, in at least thirty-eight of the
fifty States of the United States. In Nebraska, for example, a merits
selection commission recommends potential judicial appointees to the
Governor, but once appointed, a judge seeking retention must stand
for an up or down vote periodically. 63 A question I am often asked
when traveling abroad: "Isn't an elected judiciary totally at odds with
judicial independence?" How can an elected judge resist doing "what
the home crowd wants?" I invite this audience's suggestions for satis-
factory answers to those questions.
59. H.R. 3073, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
60. Anthony Lewis, Why the Courts, 55 REC. 178, 181 (2000).
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aharon Barak, President of the
Supreme Court of Israel).
62. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
63. See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Nebraska,
http://www.ajs.orgljs/NE-methods.htm (last visited July 6, 2006).
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Life tenure, enjoyed by U.S. federal judges, of course, is not the
only means a system might employ to secure judicial independence.
Some countries, to that end, have adopted fixed, non-renewable terms
for judges of their constitutional courts. Judges of the Federal Consti-
tution Court of Germany, for example, are appointed for twelve-year
non-renewable terms,64 and regular members of the French Constitu-
tional Council hold their offices for nine-year non-renewable terms.6 5
To return to my starting line, when former Chief Justice Rehnquist
described an independent judiciary as America's hallmark and pride,
he was repeating a theme sounded since the United States became a
nation. James Madison was perhaps most eloquent on the subject.
When he introduced in Congress the amendments that became the
Bill of Rights, he said:
[Ilndependent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar man-
ner the guardians of th[else rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights.
6 6
In harmony with James Madison, Justice Hugo Black 150 years
later wrote that it is the authority and responsibility of the Third
Branch (the Judiciary) to "stand against any winds that blow as
havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they
are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming
victims of prejudice and public excitement."67 Madison and Black
may have put the matter with more force than history confirms, but
their basic idea remains vibrant.
It is fitting, I think, to close with the words of two U.S. legal schol-
ars from different ends of the political spectrum-one, Bruce Fein,
known for his "conservative perspective," the other, Burt Neuborne,
known for his "progressive vision." Though often on opposite sides in
debate, they joined together to speak with one voice on the value of
judicial independence. Their co-authored essay concludes:
Judicial independence in the United States strengthens ordered liberty, do-
mestic tranquility, the rule of law, and democratic ideals. At least in our polit-
64. See Gesetz uiber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [Law on the Federal Constitu-
tional Court of Germany], art. 4, July 16, 1998, BGB1. I at 1823, available at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/ (follow "Statutes" hyperlink; then follow "Federal
Constitutional Court Act" hyperlink; then follow "Article 4" hyperlink) ("The term
of office of the judges shall be twelve years, not extending beyond retirement
age.").
65. See 1958 CONST. 56 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/citoyen/code/
(follow "La Constitution" hyperlink; then choose "English" hyperlink; then follow
"Title VII" hyperlink) ("The Constitutional Council shall consist of nine members,
whose term of office shall last nine years and shall not be renewable.").
66. James Madison, Address to the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER 224 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
67. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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ical culture, it has proved superior to any alternative form of discharging the
judicial function that has ever been tried or conceived. It would be folly to
squander this priceless constitutional gift to placate the clamors of benighted
political partisans.6 8
POSTSCRIPT
On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court announced its 5-3 disposi-
tion of the petition in Hamdan's case. 69 In the minority's view, Con-
gress had withdrawn the Court's jurisdiction to consider the case. On
the merits, the minority accepted the Government's argument that
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, had full authority to decree
the military commission process. The five-member majority deter-
mined, first, that Congress had not retroactively withdrawn the
Court's authority to adjudicate Hamdan's petition. Next, the majority
held that, absent Congress's mandate, the President lacked power to
establish a military commission unbound by the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice or the prescriptions of international accords-the Geneva
Conventions-to which the United States adheres.
The Court's decision was rooted in the Constitution's division of
authority among three branches of government. Concentration of
power in the Executive Branch, the Court observed, is antithetical to
the Constitution's tripartite scheme. It is the Court's obligation, the
Hamdan opinion holds, to make certain that if military tribunals are
established to classify and try the Guantdnamo detainees, the law-
making branch-Congress-has approved that course.
68. Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent and Ac-
countable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 63 (2000).
69. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). Chief Justice Roberts did not par-
ticipate in that decision.
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